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ON THE USE OF PRACTITIONER SURVEYS 
IN COMMERCIAL LAW RESEARCH 
Comments on Daniel Keating's 
'Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action' 
Avery Wiener Katz* 
As Daniel Keating's principal article attests, the literature on 
U.C.C. section 2-207 and the "battle of the forms" is both vast and in­
tricate.1 That fact, together with the distinguished array of commenta­
tors assembled here, makes it unlikely that I will be able to say any­
thing substantially original on that subject. Accordingly, in the spirit 
of this overall symposium, I will focus the bulk of my remarks not on 
the substantive issues raised by Keating's article, but on his methodol­
ogy. In particular, I will suggest that Keating's empirical method -
the free-form, oral interview conducted personally by the principal re­
searcher - is less reliable, and more vulnerable to distortion by the 
biases of the interviewer and respondent, than he acknowledges. 
While Keating is correct that this "hands-on" method can yield sub­
stantial insight and unearth information that could not be found 
through structured surveys or review of written company records, the 
information thus generated is not subject to the usual controls pro­
vided by those more conventional methods. Absent such controls, the 
information is much more likely to be used to confirm the inter­
viewer's or respondent's prior beliefs than to disconfirm them, or to 
corroborate conventional wisdom rather than debunk it. Thus, I 
would take his findings - that commercial actors have adjusted fairly 
well to the use of standard form contracts, that the battle of the forms 
is relatively uncommon in practice, and that significant statutory re­
form is not in order - with skepticism, at least until they have been 
confirmed by a more traditional empirical study that makes greater 
use of tabulated quantitative data and that takes greater precautions 
to screen out interpretative bias. 
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law (avkatz@law.columbia.edu). I 
am grateful to Lisa Bernstein and Clay Gillette for helpful discussions, to Daniel Keating for 
generously sharing his survey results, and to Ronald Mann and the editors of the University 
of Michigan Law Review for organizing the Symposium on Empirical Research in Commer· 
cial Transactions for which these comments were prepared. 
1. Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678, 
2683·92 (2000) (summarizing and critiquing scholarly literature on the battle of the forms), 
2760 
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Although the drawbacks of free-form interviews are well known, 
and although Professor Keating briefly mentions some of them in his 
article, it is worth restating them here a little more fully, if only to 
counterbalance the short shrift he gives them. To begin rather ab­
stractly, it is a truism of modern accounts of scientific method that em­
pirical data do not exist in a vacuum, separate from any theoretical 
framework. The world is not simply waiting out there to be observed; 
instead, it must be put in order. An empirical researcher therefore 
must choose among the various features of a complex reality, selecting 
some to notice and record, while ignoring countless others. Which as­
pects of the world are salient - which are worth noticing - will nec­
essarily depend on the theoretical lens of the observer. Similarly, the 
process of interpreting and summarizing data is also influenced by 
one's theoretical framework. 
Keating's unedited interview transcripts, for example, consist of 
approximately 280 pages in WordPerfect electronic format. His sum­
mary of these interviews takes up approximately twenty-three pages of 
his final article, nine of which describe his respondents' reactions to 
various proposals for statutory reform. In condensing this large body 
of interview material down to a coherent narrative, Keating necessar­
ily had to suppress the bulk of the information it contained. In 
choosing what information to suppress and what to accentuate, he was 
necessarily motivated by his pre-existing views of what counted as sig­
nal and what as noise. A different researcher with different theoreti­
cal preconceptions might have made quite different choices. 
As I have said, these observations are commonplace ones; and 
Keating does refer to them before launching into his main narrative.2 
In my view, however, he does not sufficiently recognize their force. 
He does not cite any of the standard texts on survey research methods, 
for instance, or indicate that those texts generally disapprove the sort 
of unstructured interviews that he undertakes.3 Nor does Keating rec­
ognize how the potential for interpretative bias, which threatens gen­
erally to infect all empirical studies, was exacerbated by several spe­
cific features of his particular methodological approach. 
Before elaborating on these specific features, though, let me point 
out just one instance of the bias that can be introduced through the in-
2. See id. at2697, 
3, For general discussions of survey research methodology, see EARL BABBIE, SURVEY 
REsEARCH METHODS (2d ed. 1990); and FLOYD J, FOWLER, JR., SURVEY REsEARCH 
METHODS ( rev. ed. 1988). Both texts emphasize throughout their discussions the impor· 
tance of standardized question design and interview scripts in producing reliable results and 
minimizing interviewer bias. See, e.g., Babbie, supra, at 144, 192-93; Fowler, supra, at 5-6, 70· 
72, 107-18. 
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terview method, just to illustrate the risks that are involved. In focus­
ing on this example, I don't intend to claim that it is randomly chosen 
or that I am immune from any of the methodological problems that I 
have just described. On the contrary, the example was particularly sa­
lient to me because it stems from a theoretical claim that I regard as 
mistaken and have argued against in prior writings.4 But the example 
is still telling, I think, because it illustrates concretely how a re­
searcher's theoretical preconceptions can enter into - and subtly bias 
- a good faith attempt at empirical description. 
The example that jumped out at me from Keating's article is an old 
and familiar claim within the literature on standard form contracts. It 
is, in short, that the use of standard forms and resistance to negotiating 
over them has something to do with market power - or as Keating 
calls it, leverage. Keating, like many influential writers before him, as­
sumes that large and powerful market actors will want to use standard 
forms, and to present those forms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, in or­
der to maximize their profits from exchange at the presumed expense 
of their contractual partners.5 This claim doesn't play a central role in 
his article, but he does refer to it at several points in his discussion and 
reports that his respondents believe it to be true.6 Further, at the end 
of his article, he devotes an entire paragraph to this claim and identi­
fies it as the factor that is likely to have the single most significant ef­
fect on the battle of the forms in the future.7 
The reason why this claim stood out for me is that it is inconsistent 
with the standard economic account of how firms with market power 
maximize profits. While it is true that the users of form contracts are 
often unwilling to do business on terms other than their standard ones, 
this is not a function of monopoly. Standardization of contracts, like 
other forms of mass production, lowers the cost of individual transac­
tions, thus giving competitive firms as well as monopolists an incentive 
to use it. The notion that a monopolist would want to offer lower­
quality or more self-serving contract terms than a competitive firm de­
pends upon a mistaken analogy between quantity and quality. Specifi­
cally, a monopolist finds it profitable to produce an inefficiently low 
4. See Avery Wiener Katz, Standard Form Contracts, in 3 THE NEW PALORAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman, ed., 1998). 
5. The claim is most famously made by Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion -
Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); later influential 
reformulations of the claim include Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983); and W. David Slawson, Standard Form Con­
tracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971). The no­
tion that "adhesion contracts" are motivated by monopoly or market power is also promi­
nently featured in judicial condemnation of form contract terms. See, e.g., Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
6. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2702, 2707, 2709, 2714. 
7. See id. at 2714. 
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quantity of goods because that forces consumers to compete against 
each other for the reduced supply, thus bidding up the price. 
If the monopolist seller tried to reduce the quality of its contract 
terms, in contrast, it would lower the value of its product to its buyers, 
reducing the markup it could profitably charge. Similarly, if a monop­
oly buyer {often called a monopsonist) reduced the quality of its con­
tract terms, it would raise its suppliers' costs and thus reduce the pos­
sible discount it could obtain from them. For this reason, a profit­
seeking monopolist generally will make the most of its market power 
by choosing a level of quality and service that best suits the prefer­
ences of its marginal customers and suppliers, for to do otherwise sac­
rifices profits. If it is worth more to the customer or supplier to have 
its own standard terms than it is to the monopolist, then the monopo­
list does better to yield on contract terms and take its profits out in the 
price.8 
To be precise, I am not disputing that larger firms might be less 
willing to yield on standard form terms than smaller firms. This would 
be the case if (and only if) the larger firms faced an increased cost in 
changing their terms, perhaps because they had larger bureaucracies, 
because they had adopted fixed methods of mass production that were 
more costly to change, or because their larger volume of transactions 
allowed them to develop reputations for quality or reliability that sub­
stitute for legal protections. But, in this case, the reason for their resis­
tance would not be monopoly power or leverage, but efficiency. 
This disparity between standard economic theory and the results 
reported by Keating prompted me to look more closely at the evi­
dence supporting the claim, which Keating attributed to his respon­
dents, that reluctance to negotiate over contract terms was related to 
leverage. In doing so, I was assisted by Keating's having generously 
made available to me an electronic copy of his interview transcripts.9 
While it would have been impractical manually to search through the 
8. See William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the 
New Antitmst Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985) (legally oriented exposition, focusing on 
product quality); Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Dis­
tribution in Buyer-seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991) (generalizing the analysis 
of product quality to contractual terms generally); A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, 
and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 407 (1975) (formal demonstration of this result using 
mathematical economics). More precisely, if all its customers or suppliers have the same 
willingness to pay for contract terms, the monopolist will do best to provide a contract with 
optimal terms and to extract all available profits through the price. Only if the tastes of the 
marginal customer or supplier are unrepresentative of the general population of contracting 
parties will suboptimal terms be offered. For example, if willingness to pay for a warranty is 
positively correlated with willingness to pay for the underlying good, then the monopolist 
will offer a suboptimal warranty (because then the amount that the marginal customer is 
willing to pay for a better warranty is less than the amount that the non-marginal customers 
would pay). 
9. Keating Interview Transcripts (1999) (document on file with the Michigan Law Re­
view). 
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full 280 pages for any reference to this claim, I was able to do a com­
puter search, and find every instance in the interviews that specific 
words related to the claim appeared. I did this for the words "lever­
age," "monopoly," and "power;" and in all found thirteen interviews 
in which these words appeared in the context of the market power 
claim.10 I then looked specifically at each such instance to see whether 
the word or words, or the concept of leverage itself, was first intro­
duced into the interview by Keating, or by his respondent - a process 
which was in most cases straightforward, but in one or two instances 
required me to read the discussion in context and exercise judgment. 
Again, my motivation for conducting this exercise was that I regarded 
the leverage claim as theoretically doubtful, and so I wanted to see 
whether this claim was truly attributable to Keating's respondents, as 
he had reported, or whether instead it arose, partly or fully, out of his 
own theoretical framework. 
The result of my exercise was that, out of thirteen interviews in 
which leverage was mentioned, Keating introduced the concept in 
eight of them.11 In four cases, the respondent introduced the concept.12 
And in one case, I judged that the introduction of the concept was 
equally attributable to both parties.13 In sum, Keating suggested the 
concept of leverage to his respondents roughly twice as often as his re­
spondents suggested it to him. 
I should reiterate that my review of the interview transcripts was 
quite limited, and I am not claiming that Keating generally supplied 
his respondents with theoretical interpretations or systematically put 
words in their mouths. Rather, I examined a single issue, the selection 
of which was motivated by my own theoretical preconceptions that the 
attributed claim was likely to be unreliable as a description of reality, 
and found, confirming my preconceptions, that Keating influenced it 
on a majority of occasions. I did not check any of the other claims he 
described in his article, or subject them to a similar test. Thus, the in­
formation my exercise revealed is at most anecdotal. In my view, 
though, it does illustrate, however symbolically, the potential for bias 
present in Keating's interview method. 
10. See id. These were Interview 3 (dated Nov. 9, 1999), Interview 7 (dated Nov. 12, 
1999), Interview 8 (dated Nov. 12, 1999), Interview 12 (dated Nov. 15, 1999), Interview 13 
(dated Nov. 22, 1999), Interview 16 (dated Feb. 8, 2000), Interview 17 (dated Nov. 30, 1999), 
Interview 19 (dated Nov. 30, 1999), Interview 20 (dated Nov. 30, 1999), Interview 21 (dated 
Dec. 1, 1999), Interview 22 (dated Dec. 1, 1999), Interview 24 (dated Dec. 3, 1999), and In­
terview 25 (dated Dec. 6, 1999). The word, "power," appeared on a few occasions in the 
context of electric power, but I excluded these references from my count. 
11. See id. (Interviews 3, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 24, and 25.). 
12. See id. (Interviews 7, 8, 21, and 22.). 
13. See id. (Interview 16, involving the single respondent whose name was supplied, one 
Tatelbaum.). 
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Let me now return to that method and elaborate more fully on the 
features that make it, in my view, particularly susceptible to the prob­
lems I have identified. The first such feature is of course Keating's 
free-form conversational format, with its resultant lack of control over 
the wording, order, and emphasis of questions. The problem here is 
not just that the lack of structure makes it easier for the researcher (or 
the respondent, for that matter) unconsciously to guide the conversa­
tion toward conclusions that are theoretically congenial. The real dif­
ficulty, rather, is that the lack of comparability between interviews 
makes it impossible for outside observers to check for signs of such 
bias without reviewing the full set of interview transcripts. Inspecting 
the interview script is not an adequate substitute for such a thorough­
going review, since that script is a mere skeleton of the subsequent 
performance to which it gives rise. As a designated commentator on 
Keating's article, I happened to have an electronic copy of the tran­
scripts, which allowed me to develop the anecdote outlined above. 
But I did not review the transcripts in any systematic way, nor would it 
have been feasible for me to do so in the limited time that I had to 
prepare my remarks. The larger symposium audience did not have 
practical access to the transcripts at all; neither will the readership of 
this journal, unless Keating is generous enough to make an electronic 
copy available to anyone who wishes to see one, as he was with me. 
A second and similar feature that makes Keating's interview 
method susceptible to bias is that the differences among Keating's in­
terviews, together with his small sample size, mean that the data he 
collected must be summarized in narrative rather than quantitative 
form, and described impressionistically rather than systematically. 
The problem here is not just sample bias and lack of statistical signifi­
cance, as Keating would have it. Rather, it is that the information he 
lays out may not accurately reflect the sample on. which it is based; 
and, more importantly, that there is no realistic way for his audience to 
check its accuracy or consider alternative interpretations. If he had 
asked a more controlled set of questions, he could have presented a 
full set of summary statistics in quantitative and tabular format. His 
audience could then be confident that it received a systematic sum­
mary of the interviews, rather than just an account of the information 
that the author personally found salient. Readers would then be able 
to inspect such statistics on their own, and could look for patterns that 
the author had not noticed or that were based on their own theoretical 
frameworks rather than the author's. With an impressionistic narra­
tive, in contrast, the audience can still deconstruct the author's text 
and look for counterexamples, as I did with my symbolic illustration, 
but its ability to re-run and re-interpret the data is substantially more 
limited. 
Third, the questions that Keating asked were particularly open­
ended and thus subject to an additional level of interpretative bias on 
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the part of his respondents. Keating did not, like Ronald Mann's con­
tribution to this Symposium on the subject of letters of credit, attempt 
to develop a random sample of actual transactions.14 He did not, like 
John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff in their study of private or­
dering in post-socialist transition economies, ask his respondents to 
comment on specific individual transactions, such as the first or most 
recent form contract with which they had dealt.15 Instead, he asked his 
respondents to characterize their usual manner of doing business, or 
their general practices as they saw them. To answer such questions, 
Keating's subjects had to operate as theorists themselves; they had to 
consult a large body of empirical experience, decide which aspects of it 
were worth reporting, and then distill these selected aspects down to a 
narrative description, which they then supplied to Keating as his raw 
data. Accordingly, their reports were necessarily influenced by their 
own theoretical frameworks, and by the institutional positions that 
they occupied within their respective organizations. Thus, it is perhaps 
not so surprising that a survey population of in-house contract lawyers 
would report that they spent a significant amount of time reviewing 
other companies' forms, or that they regularly avoid the battle of the 
forms by negotiating all the important terms of their contracts up 
front. These are the sorts of tasks that in-house lawyers are paid to 
undertake - or that they think they are paid to undertake - and it 
would instead be remarkable to find the lawyers admitting that they 
fail to accomplish such tasks, or that they leave them to be addressed 
by other organizational actors such as sales and purchasing agents. 
Indeed, if Keating had asked the same questions to a population of 
sales or purchasing agents, he might have received a set of rather dif­
ferent answers. 
Again, more important than the potential for self-serving or ideo­
logical bias in his respondents' answers is the fact that Keating's survey 
design did not allow him to check for such bias himself, if and when it 
occurred. Because Keating did not have access to the larger body of 
information on which his respondents based their answers, he could 
not perform his own search for empirical patterns that the respondents 
did not notice. Because he did not pin his respondents down to spe­
cific transactions, he could not be assured that the events they de­
scribed, whether anecdotes or generalizations, accurately reflected the 
universe of their experience or the statistical frequency of such events 
in that universe. Because he did not consider, and did not ask, ques­
tions designed to uncover the overall theoretical framework with 
which his respondents approached the empirical world, he was not in a 
14. Ronald Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 2494 (2000). 
15. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Ordering Under Dysfunctional 
Public Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000). 
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position to discount or decode their answers in light of interpretative 
perspective. 
For these reasons, the parts of the interviews in which Keating 
asked his respondents their opinion of particular statutory reforms, 
and the section of his article in which he reports on those opinions, 
seem to me particularly unreliable. Such opinions - about how com­
mercial behavior would change under a different set of legal con­
straints - are necessarily theoretical. Or more precisely, they are 
based on the respondents' experiences under current legal and com­
mercial institutions, together with their theoretical models of how the 
world works. There is little reason to think that such experiences are 
representative of the experiences they would have under other legal 
regimes, or that the process through which the respondents achieved 
positions of responsibility selected for success in evaluating proposed 
legal regimes that never existed and that they likely heard about for 
the first time in the course of Keating's interviews. Additionally, the 
respondents' views about how they would react to a change in the law 
reflects their assumptions regarding how other actors and institutions 
would react to the change - for example, if other companies re­
drafted their forms or changed their negotiation practices. But how 
these other actors and institutions would react depend on how the re­
spondents would react and so on, so that the ultimate result would de­
pend on the accumulated effect of a host of strategically interacting 
factors. There is nothing in Keating's account that suggests that either 
he or his respondents undertook a systematic strategic analysis of such 
factors.16 Thus, his survey probably says more about his theoretical 
world view and those of his respondents than anything that would ac­
tually happen if such proposals were undertaken.17 
Thus, to recapitulate my objections, Keating's methodology al­
lowed for the conflation of empirical data with theoretical framework 
not once but twice - first when his respondents summarized their ex­
periences for him and supplied him with the accounts that are found in 
the interview transcripts, and second when he summarized his experi­
ences of those interviews and supplied his audience with the account 
that is found in his article. At both levels, the usual mechanisms for 
guarding against and checking for interpretative bias were absent. 
16. Consider, for example, the lawyer who favored Victor Goldberg's proposed "best 
shot" rule, under which a court would choose whichever of the two forms is closest to the 
court's favored central position, then because he or she would not need to draft forms spe­
cific to each transaction. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2710. This simple response, however, 
is not the best strategy to follow in a world of heterogeneous contracting parties who vary in 
the terms they propose. When dealing with a partner who proposed very one-sided terms, it 
would be optimal to propose terms that are almost as self-serving, but slightly less so, just 
enough to win the court's favor. Against a more moderate partner, however, it would be 
optimal to propose more moderate terms. 
17. Consider, for example, the lawyer who favored Victor Goldberg's "best shot" pro­
posal because he was "a big fan of final offer arbitration." Id. 
2768 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:2760 
Both Keating and his subjects reported their experiences impressionis­
tically, in a manner that left ample discretion to the reporter. There 
was no attempt at either level to obtain a random sample of empirical 
events, or to summarize the events that were reported in quantitative 
or other systematic fashion, so that the audience (Keating for his re­
spondents, and us for Keating) could reasonably look to see whether 
the reports constituted a fair sample or displayed alternate patterns. 
Finally, the interactive nature of the interviews, in which both Keating 
and his respondents participated extemporaneously, makes it difficult 
- and impossible without a full review of the transcripts - to tell 
whether any interpretative bias found in the interviews derives from 
Keating's theoretical framework, from those of his respondents, or 
from a combination thereof. Thus, there is no straightforward way for 
us to discount or translate his subjective narrative into a more neutral 
or interpersonally reproducible version. 
I don't mean by my comments to discourage further empirical sur­
veys of the sort that Keating, at great effort and initiative, has under­
taken. I agree with him that we need to supplement our theoretical 
models with information from the real world and with the views of 
nonacademics. In doing so, however, we should realize that distin­
guishing our theories from the facts is not a straightforward matter, 
that it is essential to build safeguards and checking mechanisms into 
our empirical techniques to guard against interpretative bias, and that 
the standard methods of survey and statistical research are standard 
for the very reason that they do provide such safeguards when applied 
properly and with judgment by the scholarly community. 
Thus, in designing future surveys or interviews, it will be important 
to try to limit the opportunity for the respondents to edit their experi­
ences or to impose on them their own interpersonally inaccessible in­
terpretative frameworks. It will be important to present the results of 
such surveys in as systematic a manner as possible, in a form that al­
lows the audience to double-check the data and test it against its own 
theoretical conceptions. And, in cases where the raw data is not ame­
nable to quantitative summary, the most useful safeguard might be to 
be open and generous in making it available for detailed review, as 
Keating was with me. Free-form interviews of the sort that Keating 
conducted may have a legitimate role in the initial stages of a research 
project when data collection is being planned and survey questions are 
being designed. But they are not well suited for the final stages of a 
project or for drawing conclusions, even in the tentative fashion and 
with the sort of qualifications that Keating offers here. 
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2. An Afterthought: The Battle of the Forms from 
an Organizational Perspective 
2769 
I indicated at the outset of these comments that I would concen­
trate my remarks on methodological issues, but before concluding, I 
cannot resist offering just one theoretical observation on the substan­
tive topic of the battle of the forms. My observation is that the battle 
of the forms cannot be understood without reference to the problems 
of agency costs and organizational incentives. More specifically, form 
contracts are commonly used by one set of organizational actors to 
disable other actors from binding the organization on terms that might 
be in the latter actors' interests, but that the former actors do not wish 
to assume. Merger clauses, for example, which bar any promise or 
representation that does not explicitly appear in the written integra­
tion of the agreement, are commonly used for the specific purpose of 
taking contracting power away from the sales and purchasing agents 
who orally represent the organization in its dealings with outsiders, 
and to consolidate that power in the managers and legal professionals 
who control the official texts of company documents.18 
This agency-control function, while well recognized in the scholarly 
literature on form contracts generally, has somehow failed to have an 
impact on the scholarly literature on the battle of the forms. All the 
commentators discussed in Keating's article, as well as Keating himself 
in the bulk of his discussion, talk about commercial organizations as if 
they are unitary rational actors that decide whether to use standard 
forms and whether to read the forms supplied by their contractual 
partners based on the overall interests of the organization. But this 
assumption plainly fails to comport with actual practice. Commercial 
form contracts are drafted by lawyers, and administered by purchasing 
and sales agents whose compensation structure provides them with in­
centives that are not identical to (or even proportional to) the benefits 
and costs to the firm that employs them. Thus, when a company law­
yer adds a term to a standard form, or a purchasing agent makes the 
decision not to forward a customer's form to the in-house legal de­
partment, there is no guarantee that either decision is in the overall in-
terests of the firm. · 
The battle of the forms, then, should be understood not just as a 
strategic struggle between rival organizations, but also as part of a 
18. See, e.g., Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule and 
Pre-contractual Misrepresentations, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1999) (arguing that in the inter­
ests of minimizing agency costs, sophisticated commercial parties should be allowed to dis­
claim liability for their agents' pre-contractual and extra-contractual representations, 
whether fraudulent or not); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning 
Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998) (sug­
gesting that rational firms consider the costs of shirking by agents when adopting merger 
clauses). 
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strategic struggle among rival agents within organizations. Indeed, 
Keating's survey data attests to such a struggle, as when he tellingly 
recounts the belief of "more than one in-house lawyer" that "if they 
have taught their business people anything, it is never to actually sign 
the other side's form without first reading it and consulting the law 
department."19 The sales and purchasing agents who are the recipients 
of such advice, however, presumably see this contest from a different 
perspective, and if Keating had interviewed a significant number of 
such nonlegal agents, instead of focusing his study solely on in-house 
counsel, he might have heard more stories about how the lawyers mis­
understand the business end of contractual transactions and more an­
ecdotes about how the sales or purchasing department managed to 
evade the formalistic procedures that the legal department had unsuc­
cessfully attempted to impose. 
I would conjecture that the use of one-sided terms in standard 
forms, and the frequency and depth with which organizational actors 
read the forms of other firms, will be closely connected with the qual­
ity of the incentive structures that an organization offers its agents. 
On this conjecture, firms that have relatively well-functioning incen­
tive structures in place, so that the interests of in-house lawyers and of 
purchasing and sales agents are well aligned, will tend to use fewer 
one-sided terms in their own forms and will tend to communicate 
more thoroughly within the firm regarding the content of outside 
forms. In contrast, firms in which the legal and nonlegal departments 
are at war will use more one-sided terms in their forms - drafted by 
lawyers as a precaution against the purchasing and sales agents' failure 
to pass along outside forms or to report questionable terms - and will 
accordingly have poorer information regarding the content of outside 
forms, as the purchasing and sales agents react to the lawyers' antici­
pated interference by cutting them out of the informational loop. In 
order to test this conjecture, however, it would be necessary to design 
a survey that interviewed agents from various organizational depart­
ments, and that focused on agency problems and organizational con­
flict. 
More speculatively, a study that focused on agency problems might 
also have the potential to shed light on the claim, which Keating raised 
in his article and I spent some effort above to debunk, that refusal to 
bargain over contract terms is somehow related to market power or 
leverage. As I indicated above, this claim is unpersuasive if we view 
monopolists as rational profit-maximizing actors; but it has been fre­
quently put forward and is widely believed among non-economists; 
there might be something to it after all. If we recognize the role of 
agency costs in contractual negotiation, however, the claim becomes 
19. Keating, supra note 1, at 2704. (See also his discussion, id. at 2710, of the differing 
perspectives of lawyers and business people.) 
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more comprehensible. For even if an ideally maximizing monopolist 
would prefer to take its profits in the form of a more favorable price, a 
real firm operated by imperfectly motivated agents might not. The 
agents do not enjoy the full benefits of the favorable price, and will be 
tempted to shirk their duties in various ways: to reduce effort, take 
kickbacks, and the like. It is not implausible in such a setting that 
shirking could take the form of the unauthorized exercise of power 
over contractual partners. Many people enjoy exercising power and 
bending others to their will; and the pleasures of such actions may well 
be greater for individuals whose subordinate role in a bureaucracy 
puts them in the regular position of taking rather than giving orders. 
As a concrete illustration of this phenomenon (and as one last illus­
tration of the phenomenon whereby the salience of empirical experi­
ence interacts with one's theoretical world view), in traveling to this 
symposium my family and I needed to rebook our flight. The ticketing 
agent with whom we dealt likely had the opportunity to exercise her 
discretion in a way that minimized our inconvenience and expense. 
This would have entailed some cost to the airline that employed her, 
but would have bought the airline some amount of goodwill that might 
have translated at a future time into increased business. Yet, because 
the ticket agent was unlikely to share in the profits generated by this 
future business, because any trouble she went to in order to accom­
modate us was unlikely to be recognized or compensated, and because 
any psychic benefits that she might enjoy from exercising petty 
authority over us did not have to be shared with her employer, her in­
centives to exercise discretion on our behalf were not perfectly aligned 
with the interests of the airline. It may be that the ultimate result, 
which was not in our favor, was one that the airline would have cho­
sen, but it is likely for the above reasons that she was marginally less 
accommodating than it or its stockholders would have ideally wished. 
The fact that the airline in question had a virtual monopoly posi­
tion on the airport hub through which we were flying, furthermore, 
was not unrelated to the ticketing agent's incentive problem. Market 
power, together with the supernormal returns it makes possible, cre­
ates organizational slack, in that the firm can tolerate a larger degree 
of internal inefficiency without suffering losses, attracting competition, 
or drawing the attention of distant or scattered owners.20 Such slack 
provides increased opportunities for shirking of various sorts, includ­
ing the unprofitable exercise of power over customers and other con­
tractual partners of the•firm. Firms that do not earn monopoly profits, 
conversely, have less leeway to absorb or conceal the costs of such be­
havior, and other things being equal, will be less likely to suffer it 
20. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988), at 75-76 
(explaining the connection between market power and organizational slack in terms of 
asymmetric information between owners and managers). 
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without changing th�ir organizational practices. If my anecdote is rep­
resentative of a widespread phenomenon, accordingly, it could go a 
substantial way toward explaining the widely asserted connection be­
tween monopoly power and the use of adhesion contracts. 
